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John L. Margetts ("Margetts"), defendant/appellant 
I 
New West Federal Savings and Loan Association ("New 
West"), F.S.A., successor-in-interest to American Savings and 
Loan Association, a California corporation, defendant/appellant 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by S78-2a-3(j), 
U.C.A. This is an appeal from a final judgment, dated April 23, 
1990, of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. Notice of Appeal was filed May 23, 1990. On July 
31, 1990, this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by 
the Supreme Court pursuant to S78-2-2(4), U.C.A. 
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STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Code Annotated 
S78-36-3 Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life. 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, 
is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by 
subtenant, of the property or any part of it, after the expira-
tion of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, 
which specified term or period, whether established by express or 
implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall be termi-
nated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or 
period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefi-
nite time with monthly or other periodic rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or 
by subtenant after the end of any month or period, in cases where 
the owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of 
the owner, 15 days or more prior to the end of that month or 
period, has served notice requiring him to quit the premises at 
the expiration of that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he 
remains in possession of the premises after the expiration of a 
notice of not less than five days; 
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(c) when he continues in possession in person or by 
subtenant, after default in the payment of any rent and after a 
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the 
rent or the surrender of the detained premises, has remained 
uncomplied with for a period of three days after service, which 
notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises 
contrary to the covenants of the lease, or commits or permits 
waste on the premises, or when he sets up or carries on any 
unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he suffers, per-
mits, or maintains on or about the premises any nuisance, and 
remains in possession after service upon him of a three days' 
notice to quit; or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by 
subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any condition or 
covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property is 
held, other than those previously mentioned, and after notice in 
writing requiring in the alternative the performance of the con-
ditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon 
him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises 
remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within 
three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any 
subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of 
the term, or other person interested in its continuance may per-
form the condition or covenant and thereby save the lease from 
forfeiture, except that if the covenants and conditions of the 
lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be performed, then 
no notice need be given. 
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S78-36-6 Notice to quit - How served. 
The notices required by the preceding sections may be 
served: 
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail 
addressed to the tenant at his place of residence; 
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his 
usual place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of suit-
able age and discretion at either place and mailing a copy to the 
tenant at the address of his place of residence or place of busi-
ness; or 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be 
found at the place of residence, then by affixing a copy in a 
conspicuous place on the leased property. Service upon a 
subtenant may be made in the same manner. 
Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.10. Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them 
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practic-
ing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 
1.9 or 2.2 
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(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm 
may not knowingly represent a person in the same or substantially 
factually related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with 
which the lawyer has associated, had previously represented a 
client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and 
about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 
1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a 
firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a 
person with interests materially adverse to those of a client 
represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless: 
(1) The matter is the name or substantially related to 
that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the cli-
ent; and 
(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information 
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be 
waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 
1.7. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE CONDOMINIUM PUR-
CHASE AGREEMENT WAS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS ON ITS FACE AND 
NOT SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION FROM EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
GERALD SNOW, TERRACE FALLS PARTNERSHIP'S ATTORNEY, HAD 
NEITHER ACTUAL NOR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND NEW WEST TO 
THE TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MARGETTS FAILED TO 
PROVE THAT AMERICAN SAVINGS OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES FRAUDU-
LENTLY INDUCED MARGETTS TO ENTER INTO THE CONDOMINIUM PUR-
CHASE AGREEMENT. 
POINT IV 
AMERICAN SAVINGS NEVER ASSUMED THE LIABILITIES OWED BY TER-
RACE FALLS PARTNERS TO MARGETTS SIMPLY BY ACCEPTING A DEED 
IN LIEU OF FORECLOSURE. 
POINT V 
NEW WEST IS ENTITLED TO THE FAIR RENTAL VALUE OF THE CONDO-
MINIUM FROM THE DATE MARGETTS REPUDIATED THE CONDOMINIUM 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT UNTIL HE RELINQUISHED ITS POSSESSION. 
POINT VI 
THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER IS APPROPRIATE. 
POINT VII 
THE JUDGMENT AWARDING NEW WEST ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES IS 
APPROPRIATE. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
MARGETTS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY FABIAN & CLENDENIN. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
The defendant, John L. Margetts, owned a condominium in 
Park City. In 1981, he traded the Park City condominium for the 
right to receive a condominium in a project being developed in 
Salt Lake City (the "Project"). When Mr. Margetts made this 
trade, he acquired a security interest in the Project to secure 
his right to receive his unit. 
The developers needed construction financing for the 
Project. They approached American Savings and Loan ("American 
Savings), a predecessor to plaintiff New West Federal Savings and 
Loan ("New West") for construction financing for the Project. As 
a condition to financing the Project, American Savings naturally 
required that it be placed in a first lien position on the 
Project. The developers persuaded Mr. Margetts to subordinate 
his lien to American Savings. American Savings played no role in 
the negotiations leading up to Mr. Margetts' subordination. 
The developers later defaulted on their loan with Amer-
ican Savings. American Savings had no choice but to take over 
the Project. American Savings could have foreclosed and com-
pletely wiped out Mr. Margetts1 interest. Instead it agreed to 
take a deed in lieu of foreclosure and gave Margetts credit for 
his junior interest in the Project. That credit was a $150,000 
credit towards the purchase of a condominium in the Project. Mr. 
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Margetts accepted this arrangement and executed a condominium 
purchase agreement with American Savings. 
After Mr. Margetts' condominium was completed, American 
Savings permitted him to take possession of the unit prior to 
closing. Once in the condominium, Mr. Margetts repudiated his 
agreement with American Savings. He began demanding that he be 
given the condominium without any further payment on his part. 
New West succeeded American Savings and commenced this 
lawsuit. The trial court ruled that Mr. Margetts had repudiated 
his agreement with American Savings. It granted New West appro-
priate damages, including possession of the unit, rent on the 
unit, attorneys' fees and treble damages under the unlawful 
detainer statute. New West respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the trial court's rulings in this lawsuit. The facts and 
the law support those rulings and this matter should now be 
brought to a close. 
FACTS 
1. On October 3, 1980, defendant John L. Margetts 
("Margetts") entered into a contract with a limited partnership 
known as Garden Falls Condominiums ("Garden Falls"). Pursuant to 
the contract, Margetts transferred ownership of a Park City con-
dominium to Garden Falls in return for a condominium to be built 
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in a condominium project (the "Project") being developed by Gar-
den Falls. (Trial R. 30.) 
2. To secure Margetts' right to receive a condominium 
in the Project, Garden Falls gave Margetts a lien against the 
property on which the Project was to be built. (Id.) 
3. Subsequently, a partnership known as Terrace Falls 
Condominiums ("Terrace Falls Partnership") replaced Garden Falls 
as the owner and developer of the Project. (Trial R. 26.) 
4. Terrace Falls Partnership was in need of construc-
tion financing for the Project. American Savings— agreed to 
lend Terrace Falls Partnership approximately $16,000,000 to 
finance the construction of the Project provided it was given a 
first lien position on the Project. (Trial R. 27 and 28.) In 
the summer of 1981, Terrace Falls Partnership granted American 
Savings a trust deed that placed American Savings in a first lien 
position on the Project. (Trial R. 28. See also Exhibit No. 1.) 
Margetts agreed to subordinate his lien on the Project to Ameri-
can Savings. (Trial R. 29-33.) 
5. Terrace Falls Partnership worked to complete the 
Project but became bogged down in financial difficulties. By the 
2/ When the loan documents were executed, American Savings was 
known as Mountain States Savings & Loan. At the trial of 
this lawsuit, the parties stipulated that American Savings 
was the successor-in-interest to Mountain States Savings & 
Loan. (Trial R. 28 and 29.) 
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summer Of 1984, it was evident that Terrace Falls Partnership 
would default on its construction loan with American Savings. 
(Trial £• 36-37.) Through the summer of 1984, Terrace Falls 
Partnership and American Savings negotiated as to whether Ameri-
can Savings would foreclose on the Project* In September of 
1984, American Savings agreed to accept a deed in lieu of fore-
closure but only if it could obtain free and clear title to the 
Project, (Trial R. 39-41.) In September of 1984, American Sav-
ings ai\& T^tt^c^ S^lls* ?^tt.™*t^vs> %*%oit^& ^ Qe.ed ia Lle.ii at 
Foreclosure Agreement. (Exhibit 4.) Paragraph 3 of that Agree-
ment states: 
Borrowers, owner, guarantor and American will 
cooperate to obtain general releases and 
releases of trust deeds, cancellation of 
promissory notes (as applicable) and releases 
of all the creditors' claims pursuant to the 
terms of the Settlement Agreements attached 
hereto as Exhibits D-l through D-7, and 
deliver such releases into escrow. The clos-
ing, hereunder, is specifically contingent 
upon the execution and the delivery °f the 
foregoing General Releases, rec°rdable 
releases and all other documents required to 
be executed and delivered by the creditors 
under said Settlement Agreement/ in order to 
ability to transfer the same to American is 
free from doubt. 
(Trial H. 48 and 49. See Exhibit 4.) 
6. Throughout their negotiations, American Savings 
made it clear that unless Terrace Falls partnership procured 
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releases on all liens against the Project, American Savings would 
not accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure. (Trial R. 49.) How-
ever, since Terrace Falls Partnership was financially insolvent, 
American Savings agreed to front the costs incurred in reaching 
settlement agreements with all of the lienholders on the Project 
and agreed to pay the attorneys' fees incurred by Terrace Falls 
Partnership to clear title to the Project. (Trial R. 49. See 
also Exhibit 4, page 8, He.) 
7. Terrace Falls Partnership was responsible to nego-
tiate settlements with Terrace Falls Partnership lien creditors. 
Wells Stevens, the managing partner for Terrace Falls Partner-
ship, and Gerald Snow, attorney for Terrace Falls Partnership, 
entered into negotiations with the Terrace Falls Partnership 
creditors. (Trial R. 52 and 53.) Throughout the negotiations 
with these creditors, Mr. Snow "represented Terrace Falls and 
Terrace Falls, only." (Trial R. 55.) However, pursuant to the 
Deed in Lieu Agreement and because Terrace Falls Partnership was 
financially insolvent, Mr. Snow submitted his fee bills to Ameri-
can Savings and American Savings ultimately paid Mr. Snow's fees 
incurred in negotiating settlements with Terrace Falls Partner-
ship creditors. (Trial R. 54-56.) 
8. Because Margetts was a Terrace Falls Partnership 
creditor holding a lien on the Project, Mr. Snow contacted 
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Margetts. In a letter dated September 7, 1984, Mr. Snow 
explained to Margetts that American Savings had determined to 
take over the Project either by a foreclosure or a deed in lieu. 
(Trial R. 57.) The letter stated that American Savings would not 
accept a deed in lieu unless an acceptable settlement could be 
made with all junior lienholders. (id.) The letter further 
informed Margetts that with the hope of working out an acceptable 
2/ 
settlement with the junior lienholders, Lee Stevens- of American 
Savings would be coming to Salt Lake City. Margetts was invited 
to a meeting with Lee Stevens to be held in Salt Lake City. 
(id.) The meeting took place and was held at the offices of 
Kirton, McConkie, who were then American Savings1 attorneys in 
Salt Lake City. At the meeting attended by Margetts, Margetts, 
I 
Mr. Snow in his capacity as attorney for Terrace Falls Partner-
ship, Wells Stevens, in his capacity as managing partner of Ter-
race Falls Partnership, Lee Stevens as a representative of Ameri-
can Savings and an attorney from Kirton, McConkie in the capacity 
as counsel for American Savings were all present. (Trial R. 60.) 
At the meeting, Margetts was informed that if American Savings 
foreclosed on the Project, Margetts would receive nothing and his 
lien position would be wiped out. However, in a good faith 
Wells Stevens and Lee Stevens had no relation other than 
their business relation as representatives of Terrace Falls 
and American Savings, respectively. 
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effort to give him something, if Margetts was willing to release 
his lien on the Project, American Savings would pay Margetts 
$30,000.00. (Trial R. 61.) 
9. Margetts rejected the offer. Lee Stevens then 
raised the offer to $50,000.00, which was also rejected by Mr. 
Margetts. Ultimately, American Savings offered Margetts a 
$150,000 credit towards the purchase of a condominium in the 
Project in return for Margetts' release of his lien on the 
Project. Margetts accepted this offer from American Savings. To 
consummate their agreement, Margetts and American Savings exe-
cuted a Condominium Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 7), a General 
Release (Exhibit 8), and a Request for Reconveyance (Exhibit 9). 
(Trial R. 66.) By these agreements, Margetts agreed to purchase 
a condominium and American Savings granted Margetts a $150,000.00 
credit towards the purchase; Margetts released his lien on the 
Project. (Id.) 
10. At the same time that Margetts executed the above 
agreements, he also executed an agreement with Terrace Falls 
Partnership (the "Twenty Percent Agreement") (Exhibit 16). The 
Twenty Percent Agreement provided that Margetts was entitled to 
receive twenty percent of proceeds related to the Project that 
Terrace Falls Partnership might receive after executing the Deed 
in Lieu Agreement. The stated purpose of the Twenty Percent 
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Agreement was to permit Margetts to participate in any windfall 
profits the Project developers might receive after American Sav-
ings took over the Project. (Trial R. 70.) 
11. In August of 1985, Margetts took possession of 
Terrace Falls condominium number 413 ("Unit 413"). In August of 
1987, American Savings demanded that Margetts close on his pur-
chase pursuant to the Condominium Purchase Agreement. (Trial R. 
179-183.) 
12. At that time, Margetts refused to close on the 
purchase. (id.) Margetts began demanding that he be given Unit 
413 without further payment. (Id.) 
13. On March 7, 1989, New West served Margetts with a 
Notice to Quit (Exhibit 18) by certified mail in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. SS 78-36-3 and 6. (R. 6; R. 32; Trial R. 183.) 
14. On March 15, 1989, New West commenced this lawsuit 
alleging breach of contract and unlawful detailer. (R. 9.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court ruled that the Condominium Pur-
chase Agreement was clear and complete on its face. The Condo-
minium Purchase Agreement contains an integration clause. 
Because it is an integrated contract, the Condominium Purchase 
Agreement cannot be modified by extrinsic evidence. Thus, nei-
ther alleged statements by Mr. Snow nor the Twenty Percent 
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Agreement affected Margetts' obligations to perform under the 
Twenty Percent Agreement. 
II. Gerald Snow was Terrace Falls Partnership's attor-
ney. He never acted as American Savings' attorney. Therefore, 
he did not have actual authority to bind New West to the Twenty 
Percent Agreement. Furthermore, Mr. Snow did not have apparent 
authority to bind New West to the Twenty Percent Agreement. 
American Savings, New West's predecessor, never made any state-
ment or other action that could have caused Margetts to reason-
ably believe that Mr. Snow had authority to bind American Savings 
to the Twenty Percent Agreement. Alleged statements by Mr. Snow 
or Margetts' erroneous beliefs could not clothe Mr. Snow with 
apparent authority to bind American Savings. 
III. Margetts failed to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that American Savings fraudulently induced him to enter 
into the Condominium Purchase Agreement. Margetts testified at 
trial that he understood the meaning of all of the documents that 
he signed. He knew that the Condominium Purchase Agreement and 
the Twenty Percent Agreement were inconsistent. Despite this 
understanding, he signed the agreements as they were written. He 
never asked for further clarification. He never asked advice 
from his attorney that was representing him throughout the trans-
action's negotiations. Therefore, even if American Savings made 
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a material misrepresentation, which it didn't, Margetts did not 
reasonably rely on the misstatement. 
IV. American Savings did not assume Terrace Falls 
Partnership's liabilities to Margetts merely by executing the 
Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Agreement. American Savings did not 
become Terrace Falls Partnership. It only took possession of an 
asset of Terrace Falls Partnership. Terrace Falls Partnership's 
personal liability remained with the partnership. Even if Ameri-
can Savings were successor in interest to Terrace Falls Partner-
ship, it did not expressly assume liability under the Twenty Per-
cent Agreement. Therefore, in the absence of fraud, American 
Savings did not assume liability under the Twenty Percent Agree-
ment. 
V. New West put on expert testimony as to the fair 
rental value of Unit 413. Margetts never put on evidence to 
rebut the expert testimony. Because Margetts repudiated the Con-
dominium Purchase Agreement, New West was entitled to reimburse-
ment for the time that Margetts possessed Unit 413 after he repu-
diated. The best measure of that value is Unit 413's fair rental 
value during that time period. 
VI. The facts indicate that New West properly made a 
claim under the unlawful detainer statute. Margetts never raised 
an issue at the trial court level as to whether New West met 
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those requirements. It is too late now for Margetts to raise 
this issue on appeal. 
VII. The Condominium Purchase Agreement provided for 
an award of attorneys' fees if a dispute arose under that Agree-
ment. Margetts breached the Condominium Purchase Agreement. 
Therefore, an award of attorneys' fees was proper. Furthermore, 
Margetts failed to dispute the validity of the attorneys' fees 
provision at the trial court level. Therefore, Margetts cannot 
raise this issue on appeal. 
VIII. Although attorneys at Fabian & Clendenin did 
represent Margetts in some issues, at the time that New West 
filed this lawsuit, the attorneys who worked for Margetts were no 
longer associated with Fabian & Clendenin. Fabian & Clendenin 
opened its files to Margetts and Margetts' discovery revealed no 
information that related in any way to this lawsuit. Therefore, 
under Rule 1.10(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Fabian & 
Clendenin was authorized to represent New West in this lawsuit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE CONDOMINIUM PUR-
CHASE AGREEMENT WAS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS ON ITS FACE AND 
NOT SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION FROM EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
A. Standard of Review. 
In a bench decision issued immediately following the 
parties' closing arguments at the trial, Judge Rigtrup ruled that 
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the Condominium Purchase Agreement executed by Margetts and Amer-
ican Savings was complete and unambiguous on its face. (R. 469, 
Bench Decision at 3. See also Conclusions of Law, HH 2 and 4.) 
Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. 
Moires v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 
1983). This Court should review a conclusion of law under the 
correction-of-error standard of review. Brinkerhoff v. 
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989); and Mountain Fuel Sup-
ply v. Salt Lake,City, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988). 
B. Because the Condominium Purchase Agreement and Other 
Related Documents are Facially Complete and Unambigu-
ous , the Twenty Percent Agreement Cannot Be Used to 
Modify Their Terms. 
Margetts claims that as the result of the Twenty Per-
cent Agreement, he owes nothing under the Condominium Purchase 
Agreement. In an attempt to make the Twenty Percent Agreement's 
terms binding on New West, Margetts' Brief argues that the Twenty 
Percent Agreement and the Condominium Purchase Agreement should 
be read as a single document. Margetts1 Brief at 14 and 15. 
This assertion is a misapplication of basic contract principles. 
However, even if read together, the Twenty Percent Agreement does 
not bind New West. The contracts are facially complete and clear 
and American Savings was not a party to the Twenty Percent Agree-
ment. 
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When interpreting contracts, courts must first look to 
the four corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of 
the parties. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving v. Blomquist, 773 
P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Extrinsic evidence may not be used 
to explain the terms of a contract that is clear on its face. 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983) (cita-
tions omitted). 
In C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey. 758 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), the court gave a clear and concise definition of 
an ambiguous contract: 
A contract is considered ambiguous if "the words used 
to express the meaning and intention of the parties are 
insufficient in a sense that the contract may be under-
stood to reach two or more plausible meanings." 
Id. (citing Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins. Co. v. 
Finleyson. 751 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). No provision 
in either the Condominium Purchase Agreement or the Twenty Per-
cent Agreement is ambiguous as defined by C.J. Realty. 
The Twenty Percent Agreement is a one paragraph docu-
ment. It is between Terrace Falls and Margetts only. It pro-
vides that Margetts has a right to receive twenty percent of any 
proceeds received by Terrace Falls partners after execution of 
the Deed in Lieu Agreement resulting from the sale of the 
Project, from the sale of any interest in the Project or from any 
other type of Project profits. It provides nothing more. 
-14-
Likewise, the Condominium Purchase Agreement is a 
straightforward, garden variety real estate purchase agreement. 
It sets forth the terms of Margetts' purchase of condominium Unit 
413 from American Savings. It makes no mention of either the 
Twenty Percent Agreement or the terms set forth in the Twenty 
Percent Agreement. 
Furthermore, the Condominium Purchase Agreement con-
tains an integration clause. (See Exhibit 7, the Condominium 
Purchase Agreement, U 18.) When an integrated written agreement 
comprehensively lays out the parties' rights and duties, it is 
presumed to contain the parties' entire rights and obligations. 
Ron Case Roofing, 773 P.2d at 1385. 
Since the meaning of both the Condominium Purchase 
Agreement and the Twenty Percent Agreement is unambiguous, oral 
evidence is not allowed to contradict the documents' terms. 
Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners Ass'ny 656 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 
1982). Margetts' contention that he was entitled to Unit 413 
without any further payment on his part contradicts the express 
terms of the Condominium Purchase Agreement. The Condominium 
Purchase Agreement makes absolutely no mention of a possibility 
of further set-off or credits on the purchase price. The trial 
court refused to apply the Twenty Percent Agreement so as to 
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contradict the terms of the Condominium Purchase Agreement. This 
refusal was a proper application of the parol evidence rule. 
Even if read together, the Twenty Percent Agreement 
would not modify the Condominium Purchase Agreement because Amer-
ican Savings was not a party to the Twenty Percent Agreement. 
Margetts was only entitled to receive twenty percent of whatever 
Terrace Falls partners received after executing the Deed in Lieu 
Agreement, which in this case was nothing. 
II. GERALD SNOW, TERRACE FALLS' ATTORNEY, HAD NEITHER ACTUAL NOR 
APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND NEW WEST TO THE TWENTY PERCENT 
AGREEMENT. 
A. Standard of Review. 
Margetts contends that Mr. Snow orally bound American 
Savings to the Twenty Percent Agreement. In its Findings of 
Fact, the trial court found that "Mr. Snow did not have actual or 
apparent authority to enter into agreements in behalf of American 
Savings, or to modify existing agreements." (Findings of Fact, U 
14.) This Court should uphold the trial court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 
1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Ute-Cal Land Development v. Intermountain 
Stock Exch., 628 P.2d 1278, 1279, n. 2 (Utah 1981) (citing Elton 
v. Utah State Retirement Board, 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 
(1972)). 
-16-
B. There Was No Evidence Presented to Suggest That Mr. 
Snow Had Authority to Bind American Savings to the 
Twenty Percent Agreement. 
An agent cannot bind his principal unless the agent is 
acting pursuant to either actual or apparent authority. Munici-
pal Building Authority v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 279 (Utah 1985). 
Margetts failed to present any evidence that Mr. Snow was Ameri-
can Saving's agent or vested with either actual or apparent 
authority to bind American Savings. 
In his testimony at trial, Mr. Snow made clear that he 
was Terrace Falls' attorney, not American Savings' attorney. He 
emphatically stated, "I represented Terrace Falls and Terrace 
Falls only." (Trial R. 55 and 60.) Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
served as American Savings' attorneys at the time that Margetts 
entered into the Twenty Percent Agreement with Terrace Falls. 
(Trial R. 59.) Since Mr. Snow was not American Savings' attor-
ney, he could not have had actual authority to act on behalf of 
American Savings. 
Mr. Snow also lacked apparent authority to act on 
behalf of American Savings. It is well established that "appar-
ent . . . authority of any agent can be inferred only from the 
acts and conduct of the principal." City Elec. v. Dean Evans 
Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983) (citation omit-
ted). In Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 
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1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that apparent authority can 
exist only when the principal creates an appearance of circum-
stances such that it causes a third party to reasonably and pru-
dently believe that a second party has the power to act on behalf 
of the principal. 
Contrary to Margetts' assertion, it makes no difference 
that Mr. Snow never affirmatively stated that he was not American 
Savings' attorney. Even if Mr. Snow had represented himself to 
Margetts as American Savings' attorney, or if Margetts was merely 
confused, American Savings still would not be obligated under the 
Twenty Percent Agreement. An agent does not have apparent 
authority merely because it appears so to the person with whom he 
deals. w[0]ne who deals exclusively with an agent has the 
responsibility to ascertain that agent's authority despite the 
agent's representations." City Elec., 672 P.2d at 90. 
At trial, Margetts failed to establish one fact to sug-
gest that American Savings ever gave Margetts any reason to 
believe that Mr. Snow was an agent for American Savings. 
Margetts never bothered to ask American Savings whether Mr. Snow 
was American Savings' attorney. Thus, there can be only one con-
clusion: Mr. Snow was unauthorized to bind American Savings to 
any agreement. 
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Margetts places great emphasis on the fact that Ameri-
can Savings paid Mr. Snow's attorneys fees. That fact is totally 
irrelevant to the question of apparent authority. There is no 
evidence that at the time he executed the contracts Margetts knew 
that Mr. Snow's fees would be paid by American Savings. 
The facts do indicate that Margetts should have known 
that Mr. Snow lacked authority to bind American Savings. Ameri-
can Savings never held Mr. Snow out as someone with authority. 
Lee Stevens was the only person who signed documents on behalf of 
American Savings. Given these facts, the trial court's finding 
is not clearly erroneous. Thus, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's finding that Mr. Snow lacked authority to bind 
American Savings to the Twenty Percent Agreement. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MARGETTS FAILED TO 
PROVE THAT AMERICAN SAVINGS OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES FRAUDU-
LENTLY INDUCED MARGETTS TO ENTER INTO THE CONDOMINIUM PUR-
CHASE AGREEMENT. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The trial court recognized that the party asserting 
fraud has the burden to prove each and every element of fraud by 
clear and convincing evidence. (R. 467-468; Bench Decision at 
4.) The trial court then made the factual finding that Margetts 
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he reason-
ably relied on alleged statements by Mr. Snow to enter into 
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either the Condominium Purchase Agreement with American Savings 
or the Twenty Percent Agreement with Terrace Falls. Id. at 5 and 
6. As previously stated, this factual finding should be affirmed 
unless it is clearly erroneous. Doelle. 784 P.2d at 1178; 
Ute-Cal Land Dev., 628 P.2d at 1279r n. 2. 
B. Because Margetts Understood the Meaning of Both the 
Twenty Percent Agreement and The Condominium Purchase 
Agreement, He Could Not Have Reasonably Relied On 
Alleged Statements by Mr. Snow. 
One of the elements of fraud is actual justifiable 
reliance on the alleged misrepresentation. Masters v. Worsley, 
777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing Taylor v. Gasorf 
Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980)). Margetts has asserted 
throughout this lawsuit that Mr. Snow tricked him into executing 
the Twenty Percent Agreement, the Release (Exhibit 8) and the 
3/ 
Condominium Purchase Agreement.— Margetts Brief at 27 and 28. 
The facts established at trial do not support this claim. 
Margetts testified that he had read all of the con-
tracts before he signed them. (Trial R. 252 and 256.) He also 
testified that he was represented by an attorney when he executed 
the contracts. (Ld. at 253.) Margetts understood the language 
of the Condominium Purchase Agreement and the Twenty Percent 
3/ As previously stated above, Mr. Snow has consistently denied 
ever having said that he represented American Savings or 
that American Savings would be bound by the Twenty Percent 
Agreement. (Trial R. 55 and 60.) 
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Agreement. (Id. at 254 and 256.) Thus, Margetts knew when he 
signed the contracts that American Savings was not a party to the 
Twenty Percent Agreement. (R. 467-468, Bench Decision at 5; 
Findings of Fact, H 9.) He recognized the inconsistencies 
between the Twenty Percent Agreement and the alleged statements 
by Mr. Snow. (id. at H 13.) 
Despite this knowledge, Margetts never requested that 
Mr. Snow's alleged misrepresentations be memorialized in writing. 
(R. 467-468, Bench Decision at 5; Findings of Fact, H 13.) He 
signed all the documents as they were presented to him. (Trial 
R. 176.) Margetts received exactly what the contracts stated he 
would receive. w,One who gets what he bargains for cannot be 
said to be defrauded.'" State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 
1983) (quoting State v. Fisher, 79 Utah 115, 120, 8 P.2d 589, 590 
(Utah 1932). 
Based on these facts, the trial court ruled that there 
was not clear and convincing evidence that Margetts justifiably 
relied on alleged misrepresentations. This ruling is not clearly 
against the weight of the evidence. It should therefore be 
affirmed. 
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IV. AMERICAN SAVINGS NEVER ASSUMED THE LIABILITIES OWED BY TER-
RACE FALLS PARTNERS TO MARGETTS SIMPLY BY ACCEPTING A DEED 
IN LIEU OF FORECLOSURE. 
A. Standard of Review. 
Margetts contends that because American Savings 
accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure, it assumed all of Terrace 
Falls Partnership's personal liabilities. The trial court dis-
agreed ruling that American Savings did not assume Terrace Falls 
Partnership's liabilities under the Twenty Percent Agreement. 
This ruling involved mixed issues of law and fact. Thus, the 
proper standard of review for this ruling is the abuse of discre-
tion standard. Marqulies by Marqulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d, 
1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). 
B. American Savings Never Assumed Terrace Falls Partner-
ship's Contractual Liabilities. 
Margetts cannot escape the fact that American Savings 
4/ 
was not a party to the Twenty Percent Agreement.- Contracts are 
binding only upon the parties to the contract. Drummond v. 
Johnson, 643 P.2d 634, 639 (Okla. 1982); State v. Antoine, 82 
Wash. 2d 440, 511 P.2d 1351, 1354 (1973). Nevertheless, Margetts 
alleges that New West is liable under the Twenty Percent Agree-
ment as a successor to Terrace Falls Partnership. 
1/ New West is not liable under the Twenty Percent Agreement 
merely because it benefitted from the agreement. Commercial 
Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 
(Utah 1977). 
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Margetts' assertion is incorrect. First, American Sav-
ings did not become Terrace Falls Partnership. It acquired the 
Project. It acquired no other assets of Terrace Falls Partner-
ship. The liabilities owed by Terrace Falls Partnership to 
Margetts under the Twenty Percent Agreement did not run with the 
land. Margetts' rights under the agreement were rights in per-
sonalty. The Twenty Percent Agreement liabilities were Terrace 
Falls Partnership personal debts and remained with Terrace Falls 
Partnership after American Savings took over the Project. 
Second, even if American Savings (and thus New West) 
were Terrace Falls Partnership's successor, American Savings 
never assumed Terrace Falls Partnership's liabilities under the 
Twenty Percent Agreement. "If a successor does not promise to 
satisfy its predecessor's indebtedness or assume the predeces-
sor's obligations, the predecessor's creditors are not entitled 
to recover against the successor. County of Clark v. Bonanza No. 
1, 615 P.2d 939, 943 (Nev. 1980). 
There are no facts to indicate that American Savings 
assumed any liability under the Twenty Percent Agreement. The 
applicable law therefore requires that the trial court's ruling 
be affirmed. 
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V. NEW WEST IS ENTITLED TO THE FAIR RENTAL VALUE OF THE CONDO-
MINIUM FROM THE DATE MARGETTS REPUDIATED THE CONDOMINIUM 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT UNTIL HE RELINQUISHED ITS POSSESSION. 
A. Standard of Review. 
Margetts' Brief challenges the judgment awarding New 
West fair rental of the condominiun as both legal and factual 
error. Margetts Brief at 29 and 30. However, in substance, 
Margetts is asserting that New West is not entitled to rent 
because throughout the period of Margetts' possession, he pro-
vided a benefit to American Savings of equal or greater value 
than the fair rental value. Id. Thus, Margett is challenging 
the trial court's factual finding on this issue. As set forth 
above, the trial court's factual finding should be affirmed 
unless it is clearly erroneous. 
B. Margetts Failed to Present Any Evidence Rebutting New 
Westfs Expert Testimony on the Fair Rental Value of the 
Condominium Occupied by Margetts. 
During the trial, New West presented evidence that in 
August of 1987, it made a final demand on Margetts to perform his 
obligations under the Condominium Purchase Agreement and close 
the sale of Unit 413. (Trial R. 181-183.) At that time, 
Margetts repudiated the contract. (R. 467-468.) Margetts took 
possession of Unit 413 in August of 1985. Thus, at the time 
Margetts repudiated his contract with American Savings, he had 
already lived in Unit 413 for two years. 
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The trial court refused to award New West the fair 
rental value during this initial two-year period. (R. 467-468.) 
The court stated that both parties benefitted from Margetts' pos-
session during this period of time. However, the trial court 
ruled that from the time Margetts indicated he would not pay for 
the condominium, he must pay the fair rental value. This deter-
mination is consistent with Utah law. Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 
1082, 1085 (Utah 1983.) See also Marshall v. Bare, 687 P.2d 591, 
594 (Idaho Ct.App. 1984) (a purchaser of land who disaffirms the 
purchase contract while in possession must pay the seller fair 
rental value of the land); Abrams v. Financial Service Co., 
13 Utah 2d 343, 374 P.2d 309, 311 (1962) (seller is entitled to 
reasonable rent for time when a proposed buyer used house 
rent-free). 
New West provided expert testimony on the fair rental 
value of Unit 413. The witness was a real estate broker who had 
twelve years of real estate experience. (Trial R. 149.) He was 
the property manager for Terrace Falls Condominiums. (Ld. at 
150.) He had experienced managing other, similar projects. (Id. 
at 150 and 151.) Based on his experience, this witness testified 
that during the period Margetts occupied Unit 413, the fair 
rental value was between $900.00 and $1000.00 per month. (Ld. at 
158.) The trial court awarded rent of $900 per month rent 
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beginning after the date of repudiation, September 1, 1987, until 
Margetts vacated Unit 413. (Findings of Fact, U 26; Conclusions 
of Law, t 10; Bench Decision at 8 and 9.) Margetts never chal-
lenged this witness's credibility. He never rebutted the testi-
mony with his own evidence. 
Margetts was unjustly enriched by remaining in Unit 413 
after repudiating the Condominium Purchase Agreement. Knight v. 
Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). Because he failed 
to put on any evidence of fair rental value of Unit 413, the 
trial court had no choice but to accept the evidence proferred by 
New West and award $900.00 per month for rent. 
VI. THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER IS APPROPRIATE. 
A. Standard of Review. 
It is unnecessary for this Court to review whether the 
judgment for unlawful detainer. Prior to this appeal, Margetts 
never raised the issue of whether New West was making an appro-
priate claim under the unlawful detainer statute, Utah Code Ann. 
SS 78-36-3 et seq. An issue that was not raised to the trial 
court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. 
Rinqwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Broberq v. Hess, 787 P.2d 198, 201-202 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Therefore, this Court should summarily affirm the 
award for damages resulting from unlawful detainer. 
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B. New West Properly Complied With the Unlawful Detainer 
Statute and Margetts Became Liable for Unlawful 
Detainer. 
Utah's unlawful detainer statute states in pertinent 
part: 
(1) a tenant of real property, for a 
term less than life, is guilty of unlawful 
detainer: 
(a) when he continues in posses-
sion, in person or by subtenant of the 
property or any part of it, after the 
expiration of the specified term or 
period for which it is let to him, which 
specified term or period, whether estab-
lished by express or implied contract or 
whether written or parol, shall be ter-
minated without notice at the expiration 
of the specified term or period[.] 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-36-3(1)(a). Margetts' unlawful possession of 
Unit 413 met the requirements of S 78-36-3(1)(a). Margetts con-
tinued to possess Unit 413 after New West expressly demanded that 
he perform under the Condominium Purchase Agreement. Upon his 
repudiation of that contract, the implied contract by which he 
possessed Unit 413 expired. Thereafter, Margetts' possession was 
5/ 
as an unlawful.-
New West served Margetts with a Notice to Quit as 
required by S 78-36-6. In his answer to the Complaint, Margetts 
£/ This Court could also rule that Margetts was an unlawful 
detainer pursuant to S 78-36-3(1)(e). 
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admitted to having been properly served with the Notice to Quit. 
(See R. 27-51, the Answer, 1 11.) 
Finally, Margetts' strange assertion in his brief that 
the award for unlawful detainer should be overturned because Mrs. 
Margetts was not served is without merit. The unlawful detainer 
statute does not require that all occupants be personally handed 
a copy of the Notice to Quit. New West's Notice to Quit, which 
was apparently received by Mr. Margetts, was addressed to "the 
occupants of the premises located at Unit 413." (See Exhibit 17, 
the Notice to Quit.) 
Margetts failed to comply with the Notice to Quit. The 
trial court correctly determined that he was liable for unlawful 
detainer. That judgment should be affirmed. 
VII. THE JUDGMENT AWARDING NEW WEST ITS ATTORNEYS1 FEES IS 
APPROPRIATE. 
A. Standard of Review. 
This Court need not review the award of attorneys' fees 
to New West. Margetts never questioned whether an award of 
attorneys' fees was proper. Indeed, at trial, Margetts' counsel 
requested that a special hearing be scheduled where the prevail-
ing party would present attorneys' fees. (Trial R. 279.) As 
previously set forth above, an issue not raised to the trial 
court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. 
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Ringwood, 786 P.2d 1350 at 1359; Broberq, 782 P.2d at 201-202. 
The Court should summarily affirm the award of attorneys' fees. 
B. The Condominium Purchase Agreement Provides for an 
Award of Attorneys1 Fees. 
Margetts admits that the Condominium Purchase Agreement 
provides for attorneys' fees if a dispute arises under the agree-
ment. Margetts' Brief at 33. Then Margetts makes a truly puz-
zling assertion that the attorneys' fees awarded New West were 
improper because they were not based on a contract. 
It is obvious that New West's lawsuit resulted from 
Margett's refusal to perform under the Condominium Purchase 
Agreement. The trial court ruled that Margetts breached the Con-
dominium Purchase Agreement. That was the basis for the award of 
attorneys' fees. 
When a contract's terms provide for an award of attor-
neys' fees, the fees are "to be 'awarded as a matter of legal 
right.'" Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (quoting Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). This Court should ignore Margetts' bizarre assertion 
and affirm the award of attorneys' fees. 
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VIII. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
MARGETTS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY FABIAN & CLENDENIN. 
A. Standard of Review. 
"Trial courts are usually given broad discretion in 
controlling the conduct of attorneys in matters before the 
court." Marqulies by Marqulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1199 
(Utah 1985) (quoting Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 314 
(10th Cir. 1975)). In Marqulies, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the proper standard for review of a trial court's refusal to 
disqualify a law firm is the abuse of discretion standard. 696 
P.2d at 1200 (citations omitted). 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That Margetts 
Failed to Present Sufficient Facts to Establish an 
Impermissible Conflict of Interest Under Rule 1.10 of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The trial court properly used its discretion when it 
denied Margetts1 motion to disqualify Fabian & Clendenin. Rule 
1.10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct controlled the trial 
court's ruling on the disqualification motion. Rule 1.10(c) 
states in pertinent part: 
When a lawyer has terminated an association with the 
firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter repre-
senting a person with interests materially adverse to 
those of a client represented by the formerly associ-
ated lawyer unless: 
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to 
that in which the formerly associated lawyer repre-
sented the client; and 
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(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information 
. . . that is material to the matter.£/ 
(Emphas i s added.) 
The attorneys from Fabian & Clendenin who allegedly had 
previously represented Margetts were Jay Holdsworth, Narrvel E. 
Hall and Glen E. Clark. None of these attorneys was associated 
with Fabian & Clendenin at the time New West filed this lawsuit. 
(R. 1261, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dis-
qualify at 2; R. 124, Affidavit of W. Cullen Battle, f 5.) Affi-
davits provided by a shareholder and document clerk at Fabian & 
Clendenin established that Fabian & Clendenin had no information 
in its files or within its control that related to Margetts1 per-
sonal affairs, his condominium transaction or other matters that 
were at issue in this lawsuit. (See R. 117-118 and R. 119-122, 
Affidavits of Anthony L. Rampton and Alan Winters, respectively.) 
For those reasons alone, Rule 1.10(c) permitted Fabian & Clende-
nin' s representation of New West. 
Margetts' brief misstates the applicable requirements under 
Rule 1.10 asserting that "the termination of a lawyer from 
the firm doesn't avoid the conflict in a matter that 'is the 
same or substantially related' or if 'any lawyer remaining 
in the firm has information' that is confidential or could 
be used to the client's disadvantage. . . . " (Emphasis 
added.) Margetts' Brief at 12. However, Rule 1.10(c) 
clearly requires that both of these factors be present 
before an impermissible conflict arises. 
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In addition, Margetts never established the necessary 
substantial relation between Fabian & Clendenin's former 
represenation of Margetts and its representation of New West in 
this lawsuit. Various courts have applied the substantial rela-
tionship test in diverse ways. Some courts have found a substan-
tial relationship only if the representations are "identical" 
while other jurisdictions require a lesser showing of similarity. 
See, e.g., Craft Inc. v. Alton Boxboard Co., 659 F.2d 1341, 1346 
(5th Cir. 1981); NCK Org. Ltd. v. Breqman. 542 F.2d 128, 135-36 
(2nd Cir. 1976). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals defined 
"substantial relationship" in a lawsuit filed in Utah Federal 
District Court. In Smith v. Whatcottf 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th 
Cir. 1985), the court stated that a substantial relationship 
exists when "the factual context of the two representations are 
similar or related." (citing Compare Trust Corp. v. Piper Air-
craft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
Margetts claims that Fabian & Clendenin rendered advice 
to Margetts concerning the trade of his Park City condominium for 
an interest in what was to become the Terrace Falls Project. The 
record did not support his contention. Nothing in Fabian & Clen-
denin' s files substantiated this contention. However, even if 
this were true, the Park City condominium trade had nothing to do 
with the disputed issues of this case. This lawsuit involved a 
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transaction between Margetts and New West's predecessor, American 
Savings, that originated in 1984, when American Savings agreed to 
sell Terrace Falls Unit 413 to Margetts and Margetts agreed to 
release his junior trust deed against the Terrace Falls Project 
so that New West's predecessor could complete a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure. The last advice allegedly rendered by Fabian & 
Clendenin to Margetts was in 1979, five years before the transac-
tion at issue in this lawsuit. (R. 127.) The trade of a Park 
City condominium has absolutely nothing to do with Margetts' 
agreement to purchase a condominium from New West or with the 
Twenty Percent Agreement or with Margetts' failure to ultimately 
close on Unit 413. 
When the trial court denied Margett's motion to dis-
qualify, it also permitted Margetts additional discovery of 
Fabian & Clendenin's files for the purpose of renewing its motion 
at a later date. Despite this invitation to present information 
showing a conflict, Margetts never established that work per-
formed for him by attorneys at Fabian & Clendenin was in any way 
related to this lawsuit. Margetts had the burden of proof on 
whether Fabian &,Clendenin's previous representation was substan-
tially factually related to this lawsuit. See Duncan v. Merrill, 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d at 1020, 1028-29; 
INA Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Nalibotsky, 594 F.Supp. 1199, 1207 
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(E.D. Pa. 1984). Margetts could not meet this burden of proof 
because Fabian & Clendenin's representation of New West in this 
lawsuit was perfectly permissible. 
On appeal, Margetts offers the Court nothing but argu-
ment and conclusions with no basis in fact. Courts have uni-
formly held that such generalized and superficial conclusions are 
inadequate as a matter of law to support a motion to disqualify. 
See Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1029; INA Underwriters Ins., 594 F.Supp. 
at 1199, 1206-11. 
The trial court correctly ruled that Fabian & Clendenin 
could represent New West in this lawsuit. Certainly the ruling 
was not an abuse of discretion. Consequently, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's ruling. 
-34-
CONCLUSION 
The trial court ruled correctly in this lawsuit. For 
the reasons set forth above, New West respectfully requests that 
this Court affirm all aspects of the judgment entered by the 
trial court in this lawsuit. 
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